null
Dianne Wampler 05/21/2007 09:10:38 PM From DB/Inbox: Dianne Wampler

Cable Text:

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 01205

SIPDIS CX:

ACTION: PMA

INFO: ECON TSR AMB POL FCS PA CONS DCM DAO RAO

DISSEMINATION: PMA /1

CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM:NMCELDOWNEY DRAFTED: DCM:NMCELDOWNEY

CLEARED: PMA:CSIEBENTRITT, TSR:RPISTANA

VZCZCAYI209

OO RUEHC RUEHZG RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RHMFISS

DE RUEHAK #1205 1381405

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181405Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKA

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2168
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 001205

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2022 TAGS: <u>PREL MARR NATO EU TU</u>

SUBJECT: TURKEY: TGS ON KOSOVO/ESDP DISPUTE: HARD LINE ON

PRINCIPLE WITH GLIMMER OF COMPROMISE ON ARRANGEMENTS

REF: A. ANKARA 1192

¶B. ANKARA 1052

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

- 11. (U) This is an action request -- please see para 5.
- 12. (C) Turkish D/CHOD Saygun called in DCM May 18 to discuss NATO deliberations on the Transition Directive for Kosovo. Saygun noted that SACEUR had called Turkish CHOD Buyukanit May 17 to urge that Turkey set aside its objections and join consensus. Saygun was blunt and categorical in describing Turkey's view on this matter. He said that the issue had gone to President Sezer and that the GOT was unwavering in its bottom line -- this is not a matter of arcane procedure but a fundamental question about the role of Cyprus in the EU and with respect to NATO.
- 13. (C) We countered that Turkey was pursuing the right idea in the wrong way. The US and other allies were sympathetic toward Turkey's concerns about EU decision-making and specifically the role that Cyprus was playing in shaping EU decisions involving Turkey. However, threatening to disrupt transition arrangements for Kosovo at this delicate moment was a step that sorely disserved all involved. Turkey has invested a great deal in the success of the Kosovo operation and the last thing that should happen now is for Turkey to adopt a position that would undermine that operation.
- 14. (C) Following an extended exchange, Saygun conceded that there may be a way to proceed toward a solution on Kosovo. He noted that a similar dispute had arisen during the deliberations on Darfur and that a compromise formulation -- what he described as a "generic" reference to the Framework Agreement -- had been developed. This, he suggested, might

be the basis for a solution on Kosovo. However, he cautioned that Turkish flexibility was limited and that even if a compromise were found, Turkey will still insist that the broader issues related to NATO-EU dialogue and the role of Cyprus be addressed and resolved in the immediate future.

15. (C) Action Request: Saygun is one of the key GOT decision-makers on this matter and probably the only one empowered to work out a solution on the hyper-sensitive bedrock issue of Cyprus. If the Darfur language does indeed present an acceptable compromise (something we are not in a position to judge) we should relay that back to Saygun directly. Request Department provide guidance as soon as possible.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON